南京财经大学 硕士学位论文 终极控制人性质、金字塔控制与“利益输送” 姓名：赵静杰 申请学位级别：硕士 专业：会计学 指导教师：王玉春 2011-01-08 I 摘摘 要要 随着股改的完成，控股股东的法人股逐步解禁流通，其利益与上市公司股价 的联系更加紧密， 终极控制人与中小股东之间的利益趋同的联盟效应将进一步增 强。但是，在中国上市公司普遍存在的股权集中型公司治理模式下，终极控制人 通过构建金字塔控制结构，以较少的现金投入获得了较多的控制权，使得终极控 制人的控制权和现金流所有权发生分离，有足够的动机和能力谋取控制权私利。 终极控制人的 “利益输送” 行为必将变得更加隐蔽， 与股改前有显著变化。 所以， 只有当投资者清楚地了解上市公司的各大控股股东及其控股关系， 并且追溯到最 终控制人时，才能更好的分析上市公司的财务行为。以寻求解决终极控制人和其 他中小投资者之间利益冲突问题的更好办法，从而更好地保护投资者利益。 本文首先回顾了国内外关于终极控制人、金字塔控制结构和“利益输送”方 面的研究成果，以代理理论为起点，构建金字塔控制结构下终极控制人“利益输 送”的分析框架。再运用实证分析法，以我国上市公司 2006 年至 2008 年相关数 据进行回归分析，重点研究终极控制人股权性质、金字塔控制结构、控制权和现 金流所有权的分离三个因素与终极控制人的“利益输送”行为之间的关系。 实证结果表明：终极控制人为中央政府的上市公司，其“利益输送”的总程 度最小； 政府终极控制的上市公司的控股股东比较倾向于通过经营性往来方式实 施“利益输送”行为，自然人终极控制的上市公司的控股股东比较倾向于通过非 经营性往来方式实施“利益输送”行为；自然人对上市公司的金字塔控制层级越 多，控制权和现金流所有权的分离程度越大， “利益输送”行为越严重；而在中 央政府终极控制的上市公司中，金字塔控制层级越少， “利益输送”行为越严重； 控制权和现金流所有权的分离强化了终极控制人对上市公司的 “利益输送” 行为。 最后，根据本文的研究结论提出了相关的政策建议，有助于国有资产管理体 制的完善、有助于国家对资本市场及上市公司的管理、有助于督促上市公司构建 更合理的公司治理机制、也有助于对中小投资者的保护机制的建设，促进我国资 本市场的健康发展。 关键词关键词：终极控制人；金字塔控制结构；两权分离度； “利益输送” II ABSTRACT With the completion of the share-reform, the controlling shareholders legal person shares are gradually lifted a ban and circulating. Its benefit is linked more closely with the listed companys share price. The union convergence of interest effect between ultimate controller and small shareholders will be further enhanced. But, under concentrated-ownership corporate governance modes that widespread in the Chinese listed companies, ultimate controller gains more control rights with less cash through constructing a pyramidal control structure. So the control rights and cash flow ownership of ultimate controller have been separated, deviating from the principle of one share one vote. In this case, ultimate controllers interest is reflected by its cash flow ownership rather than the directly proportion of the largest shareholder. Therefore, its better to grasp the nature of the problem by researching the ultimate controller of listed companies. The most important and most common way to control listed companies by ultimate controller is pyramidal control structure. With less cash flow ownership to control listed companies, it has enough motivation and ability to seek private benefits of control. As a result, the core problem of corporate governance in Chinese listed companies has been changed to conflicts of interest between ultimate controller and other small investors. Only when investors clearly understand the major controlling shareholders of listed companies and their controlling relationship, and trace to the ultimate controller, investors can better analyze the finance behavior of listed companies and their interest can be protected better. The essay firstly reviews the research achievements on the ultimate controller, pyramidal control structure and tunneling at home and abroad. Under the guidance of the agency theory, the essay constructs an analytical framework of ultimate controllers tunneling under pyramidal control structure. Then, the essay adopts empirical approach based on the data about the Chinese listed companies over period 2006-2008. Mainly analyze the relationship between three factors and ultimate controllers tunneling. The three factors are the type of ultimate controller, pyramidal control structure and the separation between controlling shareholders control rights and cash flow ownership The empirical results show that: the degree of controlling shareholders tunneling in the central government ultimately controlled companies is the least; controlling shareholders in government ultimately controlled companies tunnel through III productive operation while controlling shareholders in natural person ultimately controlled companies tunnel through non-productive method; the more the pyramidal structure layers in nature person controlled companies and the bigger the degree of the separation between the ultimate controllers control rights and cash flow ownership, the more severe the tunneling of controlling shareholders; in central government controlled companies, the less the pyramidal structure layers and the more severe the tunneling of controlling shareholders; the separation of control rights and cash flow ownership strengthens the tunneling of controlling shareholders. Finally, based on the conclusion of the empirical analysis, we give some suggestions. They contribute to the improvement of state-owned assets management system, help to the management of capital markets and listed companies, help to urge the listed companies build more reasonable corporate governance mechanism, and also contribute to the construction of small investors protection mechanism, and to promote the healthy development of Chinas capital market. Key Words: Ultimate controller; Pyramidal control structure; Rights separation degree; Tunneling 学位论文独创性声明学位论文独创性声明 本论文是我个人在导师指导下进行的研究工作及取得的研究成果。 论文中除 了特别加以标注和致谢的地方外， 不包含其他人或其它机构已经发表或撰写过的 研究成果。 其他同志对本研究的启发和所做的贡献均已在论文中作了明确的声明 并表示了谢意。 作者签名： 日期： 学位论文使用