With regard to corporate governance structure of a number of issues(A) the basic concept of Governance structure is very difficult to accurately translate a word. Its original form is Corporate governance, internal a corporate governance structure, corporate governance structure, corporate governance mechanism in several translations. Although this book uses a corporate governance structure of this kind of translation, but here the structure should be understood as both agency (Institutions), system (systems) and control mechanisms (Control Mechanism) multiple meanings. In short, corporate governance structure is the arrangement among the countries of the enterprise system. Such institutional arrangements, a narrow sense, refers to the corporate separation of ownership and management conditions, investors and listed companies and controlling the distribution of benefits between the relations (Greek columns law and Wei Xini 1996; Schleifer and Vishny 1996) , can be broadly understood as on business organization, control mechanisms, the distribution of benefits to all, institutions, cultural and institutional arrangements, defining not only the businesses and their owners (shareholders) the relationship between the companies and all relevant but also interest groups (such as employees, customers, suppliers, communities, etc., collectively referred to as stakeholders) relationship. Institutional arrangements for deciding whom such a service, who control the risks and benefits of how the distribution among the various interest groups, such as a series of problems. This system arrangement is reasonable or not is the most important determinant of business performance factors. From the perspective of improving business performance, corporate governance structure to study the problem can be divided into two broad categories. The first category is manager layer, within the persons interest mechanism (Incentive Issue) and its relationship with corporate interests and the interests of outside investors compatibility issues; here, both the incentive management level control problems, but also corporate social responsibility issues; this economists focus of the study. The second category is the manager level management capabilities (The Competency Issue), which is due to corporate leadership (CEO, Board of Directors) and management capabilities, ways of thinking and environmental requirements arising from the decision-making mistakes dislocation problems; housekeeper often have a more concern. From the interest mechanism point of view, the reform of corporate governance structure, to answer what kind of enterprise system in the best interests to ensure that investors in listed companies in the assets are duly protected and access to a reasonable return on investment issue, or more Specifically, is how to ensure the legitimate rights and interests of outside investors will not be business insiders (managers controlling layer and the possession of large shareholders) misappropriation of issues. Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations in respect of that employment management companies manager at work is generally not so dedicated as the owners. In 1932, love Dev. Burleigh (Adolph Berle), and Kerry were satisfied. Mi Enns (Gardiner Means) of enterprise ownership and management resulting from the separation of the principals (shareholders) and the agent (manager level) made between the interests of departure from the economics laid the agent behavior basis. As the principal and agent, and information between the interests of departure from the high costs caused by monitoring is not complete, business management decisions made by professional managers may deviate from the corporate interests of investors. For example, the investors goal is to maximize investment returns, while professional managers tend to pursue the maximization of enterprise scale, not only because of the remuneration of managers in practice with a positive correlation between firm size, but also because of the size and growth of their own brought about by come to power and status. This is more harmful than the agents embezzlement phenomenon in the performance of enterprise management for a variety of erosion on the interests of the clients agent acts. For example, managers with the transfer pricing and a low price to the assets sold to his own possession, controlled by other companies (or buy at high prices), to pay their inflated salaries and the anti-annexation golden parachute, the expansion serving a variety of improper spending, and so on. Because of this agent acts may be the existence of a countrys corporate governance structure for the as a client is the effective protection of the interests of outside investors or not, not only to investors and the manager level, the internal distribution of benefits among problems, but also directly affect the countrys economy. If the external one (ie, the