原文： Managerial Ownership and Corporate Performance in Slovenian Post-Privatization PeriodAbstractWhile Slovenian post-privatization period has been characterized by a decline in the ownership of the non-managerial owners (employees), managers have been increasing their control. Moreover, given that the optimal ownership stake (as stated by the managers) in the year 2002 exceeded their actual share by 10.8 percentage points, we expect the managers to continue consolidating their ownership also in the future. The aim of our paper is to describe the main trends in the ownership of Slovenian corporations in the post-privatization period and to provide an answer to the basic economic question: what is the influence of the ongoing consolidation of managerial ownership on the performance of Slovenian firms. The empirical analysis testing this relationship is based on a panel of 182 Slovenian firms in the period 1995-99 and does not provide relevant evidence on positive effects of the increasing managerial control on the performance of Slovenian firms. If any, positive incentive effect is observed only in the firms with managers holdings exceeding 10-percent, only with regards to firm financial performance (but not total factor productivity) and only in firms that are not listed on the capital market. Furthermore, the negative effect of the current gap between the optimal and actual managerial ownership seems to prevail over any positive incentive effect arising out of managerial ownership. IntroductionThe increasing managerial ownership, apart from the reduction in the ownership of State-controlled funds and employees, represent one of the main features that characterize the ownership changes in the Slovenian post-privatization period. Most prominent are the increases in managerial stakes in non-listed firms, in which the transfer of ownership realizes at relatively low prices and mostly remain publicly undisclosed. Moreover, given that Slovenian managers still claim to be unsatisfied with their current ownership stakes (at the end of 2002 the optimal ownership stake of an average Slovenian manager exceeded his actual ownership stake by 10.8 percentage points), we expect the observed trends in the evolution of the ownership and control of Slovenian corporations to continue in the same direction also the future. The accumulation of ownership in the hands of managers is further motivated by the relatively low transparency of the ownership transfers in Slovenia. In any case, it is not the aim of this paper to discuss the fairness of the observed redistribution of the privatized capital, neither to deal with the importance of such redistribution for the preservation of the domestic ownership，but rather to provide an answer to the basic economic question, namely to determine the impact of the observed increases in the managerial ownership on the performance of Slovenian firms.We start in the second section with an overview of the managerial ownership as a corporate governance mechanism in the developed market economies. Third section provides further evidence on the role of the managerial and insider ownership in transition economies and especially in Slovenia (section 4). Fifth section states the main hypotheses on the influence of the managerial ownership on firm performance in Slovenia. The main empirical models underlying the analysis of the relation between managerial ownership and firm economic efficiency and financial performance are presented in the sixth section. The last section states the main empirical results and concludes. Managerial ownership as a corporate governance mechanismBlockholdings represent one of the main factors of distinction between the insider (Continental European) and outsider (Anglo-Saxon) systems of corporate governance. While the ownership and control structure of most of the corporations listed in the United Kingdom and in the United States still mostly reflect the typical Berle and Means corporation and the market for corporate control one of the main mechanisms alleviating the conflict of interests between the managers (agents) and owners (principal), large blockholders in the Continental Europe gain control over their agents through concentrating their ownership and voting rights. In any case, blockholders can be found in the outsider governance system as well. For example, half of the firms listed on the New York and NASDAQ Stock Exchanges on average have three shareholders with at least 5 percent ownership blocks. However, on the contrary to the Continental Europe, institutional investors or board members hold most of these blocks. While the former usually stay passive and don t intervene in the firms decision-making, managers normally hold between 20 and 40 percent of the voting rights and decisively participate in the governance and consequently influence the performance of the firms they own (Becht, 2001; Holderness and Sheehan, 2001). Similarly, for a