23The Right to SecurityLiora LazarusIntroductionThe right to security is enshrined in international human rights treaties and consti- tutions globally. In many of these provisions, the right is articulated alongside the right to liberty from the state. In others, the right is linked to freedom from violence or bodily invasion from non-state actors. These rights give rise to correlative duties which can at times appear diametrically opposed. One right calls for protection from the state, while the other calls for state protection. These opposing dimensions give rise to different philosophical justifications for why security ought to be regarded as a human right. At first blush, both aspects of the right to security seem axiomatically a good thing. All people share the ambition to live free from fear of attack, loss of life, arbitrary arrest, detention or coercive interrogation. This chapter explores the theoretical argu- ments that support the recognition of that ambition as a right worthy of legal and moral protection. Section I identifies competing conceptions of security in the the- ories of Hobbes and Locke. Section II discusses the philosophical justifications for the right to security in the work of Blackstone, Shue, Fredman, Powell, and Ramsay. Section III exposes the problems associated with broad conceptions of security as a meta-right, and argues in favour of a specific and narrow conception of the right.I. Competing Conceptions of SecurityBefore embarking on this analysis it is worth our setting out some key distinctions. There is a difference between recognizing the good of security, and recognizing whether specific actions taken in its pursuit constitute a social good. There is also a difference between recognizing the social good of security, and deciding that we ought to recognize and protect an individuals right to security. Finally, there is a difference between recognizing a right to security in principle, and determining the scope of the correlative obligations it places upon states and the weight it holds relative to other rights. What makes security a good? Loader and Walker argue that security is a “thick” public good, a great civilizing force, and a necessary and virtuous component of the good society.1 Their arguments are not without key antecedents, for Hobbes and Locke thought carefully about security too.1 Ian Loader and Neil Walker, Civilizing Security (Cambridge University Press, 2007).424 The Right to SecurityA. Hobbes and the primacy of peaceEver since Hobbes Leviathan, security has been identified as the primary benefit of political community, and the good against which we trade off our natural liberty. The rationale of the Hobbesian state, and the foundation of its legitimacy, rest on its assur- ance of the security of its citizens. Hobbes social contract is the route through which mankind averts the social conditions whereby every man is enemy to every man and men live without other security.2 In this condition of war, Hobbes was convinced that no civilization, no self-realization, nothing good about being human, could be achieved and life would be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.3 Humanitys tran- sition from a state of nature to a political community is thus motivated by the promise of security, which in turn provides conditions in which our lives can become mean- ingful, and culturally and socially expressive. Little to dispute thus far. But Hobbes went on to give security such primacy that no one in his society can contest the power of the provider of peace: the sovereign power constituted by the mutual consent of those inside a commonwealth. Hobbes social contract was a bargain between individuals to cede their libertyor right to do every thingto the extent necessary to avoid war.4 In so doing, they agreed to afford the sovereignwhich he referred to as the Mortal Godunlimited power.5 Security, then, for Hobbes, was both the rationale for the existence of the state, and the justifi- cation for unlimited sovereign power over the subjects within it. The sovereign may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defence.6 Hobbes drew a stark distinction between peace (or bare security) assured by the absolute power of the sovereign, and war where such power is limited, divided or infringed. Because individuals contract with one another to mutually obey the sov- ereign in return for security, the sovereign cannot be held to account for breach of that contract.7 The powers which constituted the essence of sovereignty were indivis- ible.8 It mattered not whether sovereignty was vested in a monarch or a democratically elected power, but whether that power was capable of eliminating war and the threat of war between men in his society. This concern for peace was by no means abstract. Writing at the end of the English Civil War, Hobbes was evid