外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文：一、外文原文：原文：原文：DETERMINANTSDETERMINANTS OFOF INCENTIVEINCENTIVE INTENSITYINTENSITY ININ GROUPBASEDGROUPBASED REWARDSREWARDSTHEORYTHEORY ANDAND HYPOTHESESHYPOTHESESAgency Theory and Incentive IntensityA fundamental argument in the agency theory literature and in much of the compensation literature is that the incentive intensity of rewardsoften measured as the variable portion of payenhances employee contributions to performance. Incentive-intensive pay increases effort and may increase the talent level of those attracted to a compensation plan. Higher incentive intensity increases the marginal gains in income that employees receive from increased effort. If increased effort has physical or psychological costs, agents will choose levels of effort whereby the marginal gain from effort equals its marginal cost. Therefore, when pay plans are more incentive-intensive, employees reach higher levels of effort before deciding that these increases fail to compensate for their personal costs. Research in a variety of fields confirms this relationship between incentive intensity and effort (e.g., Ehrenberg Landau Zenger, 1992).Higher incentive intensity may also help companies lure and keep talented workers (Lazear, 1986; Rynes, 1987; Zenger, 1994). Given the randomness of measured performance, as incentive intensity rises, so does the uncertainty of an individuals pay. The higher the incentive intensity, the more likely it is that only the very best performers (those who have the highest probability of generating strong measured performance) will find it efficient to assume the risk of an incentive-intensive contract. As suggested in empirical studies, employees with lower abilitythose unlikely to generate high performancewill prefer contracts that place less emphasis on performance (Cable U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 1988;Zenger, 1994).Incentive intensity in group rewards should function much like incentive intensity in individual rewards: higher levels should motivate effort, lure talent, and thereby enhance performance. As Kruse argued in regard to profit-sharing plans, “The size of the profit share in relation to other employee compensation should clearly be an important factor in the impact of profit sharing upon workplace relations and performance. A profit share that, forexample, averages less than 1 percent of employee compensation is unlikely to be taken seriously by employees as an incentive for increased effort, monitoring, and cooperation with workers“ (1993:81). By escalating the incentive intensity of group rewards (the incentive portion of pay), managers enhance the individual benefit from increased group effort and promote desirable self-selection. Although group incentive pay is less attractive to top talent than individual incentive pay (see Cable Weiss, 1987), top talent should prefer highly incentive-intensive group pay to weakly incentive-intensive group pay. Kruse (1993) provided some empirical evidence of a relationship between incentive intensity and performance in group rewards. Thus, our motivation for exploring the determinants of incentive intensity stemmed from the underlying assumption that higher incentive intensity triggers higher effort, lures superior talent, and generally yields higher performance levels.Costs of Increasing Incentive IntensityThe rather low incentive intensity characteristic of rewards in many firms suggests significant impediments to raising incentive intensity. Agency theorists point to four impediments. First, incentive intensity is constrained by agents inability to control performance measures (Lai Milgrom Weitzman, 1980). If agents cannot control performance measures, then imposing high levels of incentive intensity imposes substantial uncertainty on employees and provides rather modest motivational benefits.Second, incentive intensity is constrained by the inaccuracy of performance measures, or the weakness of the link between true and measured performance (Holmstrom Milgrom Milgrom Pfeffer Zenger, 1992). Higher incentive intensity generates greater variance in pay and magnifies the negative effects of comparison processes (Lazear, 1989; Pfeffer Deutsch, 1985). Lowering incentive intensity reduces pay variance and thus diminishes the effects of these comparisons. Fourth, incentive intensity is constrained by “intertemporal“ problems of incentive ratcheting and output restriction. Managers have an incentive to strategically alter incentive structures, adjusting payouts downward (or performance hurdles upward) once employees reveal their capacity to perform (Gibbons, 1987; Miller, 1992). Recognizing this managerial incentive, employees have an incentive to restrict output in anticipation of downward ratcheting of payouts should they reveal their capacity for hard work (Mathewson, 1931; Whyte,1955). Such concerns may prompt the reduction or elimination of incentive intensity in rewards.Determinants of Incentive Inten