Cooperation in Tackling the Bluefin Tuna Overfishing Problem Robert Keohanes Theoretical Explanations and SolutionsIntroduction Four newspaper articles published between June 2007 and March 2010 showed us the grave environmental problem of the depletion of major fish stocks in the world oceans, bluefin tuna in particular. The performances of the international society with regard to this problem are poor: countries accuse each other, trying to shift the blame to others; European Union and Japan still allow illegal industrial fishing and turn a blind eye to violations; efforts to deal with the problem are slow and segregated. How to explain this situation? Why is it difficult to control it? How to solve it? In light of the theoretical argument he presented in After Hegemony, we can summarize Robert Keohanes explanations of this problem in two points. First, it is because of the collapse of U.S. hegemony after 1970s. No impelling power can dominate such international issue. Second, because of the absence of cooperation and the malfunctions of the existing international organizations in the “after hegemony“ era, some countries and interest-groups, facing a Prisoners Dilemma and falling into the problem of Collective action, always violate rules to seek their “myopic self-interests“ (p. 98). Facing such problem, Keohane would probably recommend to strengthen multilateral cooperation through the adjustment and integration of the existing international regimes, so as to provide legal liability, reduce transaction costs, provide symmetric information and facilitate creation of reputation, which, he thinks, will be a feasible solution. Finally, the author will give his comment on Keohanes plan from realistic considerations.Body . Explanations for the overfishing problemFirst of all, Keohane admits realists three basic assumptions. they are: anarchy of international system; nations are all rational; nations are selfish. As he said, “On this Realist foundation, I build an institutionalist edifice“ (p. X, preface to the 2005 edition). Hence, Keohane accepts the realistic explanation that countries are driven by their national interests. While “a single fish can fetch tens of thousands of dollars as demand grows for dishes like sushi“ (NY times, 25 June 2007), there is no doubt that thousands of fishing fleets would run for bluefin tuna. However, the above idea is not Keohanes focus. Yes, Fishing fleets are pursueing in the lucrative tuna fishing business, but why cannot they realize their overfishing behaviour is short-sighted and why no group can govern and effectively solve this problem? Keohanes answers are the Hegemon Americas decline and the lack of big powers cooperation. Keohane knows that the international system is anarchic, but he agrees with the first proposition of the theory of hegemonic stability that hegemon can function as a world government to manage world affairs. Or as what he said “hegemony can facilitate a certain type of cooperation“ (p.31). So, if America still acts as a hegemon, maybe he can order Japan to stop importing huge amount of bluefin tuna and force EU to lower its quota. But the problem is, as what the book named, America is not that powerful enough after the 1970s (chapter 9) and we are in a “after hegemony“ era. “The Europeans, in particular, are less inclined to defer to American initiatives, nor do they believe so strongly that they must do so in order to obtain essential military protection against the Soviet Union“ (p. 49). That is why EU sheltered its member countries and opposed to “lower catch limits and extend closed seasons“ (The Independent, 29 Nov. 2008) despite U.S. accused it. Keohanes second explanation is that cooperation “after hegemon“ is possible but we can not see cooperation here in this overfishing issue. “In the absence of cooperation, governments will intervene in markets unilaterally in pursuit of what they regard as their own interests“ (p. 50). In order to protect domestic fishery industry, France and Italy turned a blind eye to behaviours that violated the government quotas and treaties. Meanwhile, the existing international organizations always failed to influence overfishing behaviours in some countries.Keohane gives us the reason, “sovereignty and self-help mean that the principles and rules of international regimes will necessarily be weaker than in domestic society“ (p. 62). In a word, the problem of bluetin tuna overfishing in such a “self-help“ world is pretty much like the Prisoners Dilemma or the Collective Action problem, nobody would like to take responsibility or to cooperate for a global problem, because “the dominant strategy for an egoistic individualist is to defect“ (p. 69). . Keohanes planWhat will Keohane recommend to control this problem? In light of his theoretical argument, he will probably suggest to strengthen multilateral cooperation through the adjustment and integration of the existing international regimes. First,