I我国证券发行监管制度变迁的有效性及制度选择研究摘摘 要要作为证券市场基础性制度之一和第一道门槛，证券发行监管制度所发挥的作用举足轻重。无论是成熟市场还是新兴市场，都设立了较为完备的证券发行监管制度，目的是通过对证券发行行为进行监管来保护投资者利益。分析总结我国证券发行监管制度所发挥的作用和存在的问题、并提出有前瞻性的建议，对于我国证券市场的发展和完善至关重要。本文通过定量分析和博弈理论研究了证券发行市场参与主体发行者、中介机构和监管者的最优策略以及影响发行者信息欺诈水平和市场业绩的因素；随后回顾了我国证券发行监管政策变迁的历史，实证了首次公开发行和再发行监管政策变迁的效果；在前面理论和实证的基础上利用模型分析比较了发行注册制和发行核准制的区别，比较了两种发行制度的信息欺诈水平和社会福利损失情况以及两种发行制度的适应性环境和变迁问题，最后探讨了在不同环境下发行监管制度的选择问题，并对如何降低信息欺诈水平和我国证券发行监管制度的改革提出了政策建议。论文的主要工作和创新点包括：1、通过建立证券发行市场参与主体之间的博弈模型，得到了系统的均衡策略。分析了投资者的成熟程度、法律的完备程度、监管者的监管水平和对投资者利益的保护程度等因素对信息欺诈水平、惩罚水平和投资者收益水平的影响。研究了如何有效降低证券发行中的信息欺诈水平，以促进信息如实披露。2、建立了评价证券发行监管制度变迁效果的模型，分别从经营业绩、信息欺诈水平和市场业绩深入分析了 IPO 历次政策变迁的效果。结果表明，政策的变迁并不是总能达到预期的效果，在不断完善 IPO 监管制度的过程中，要特别注重政策变迁效果的研究。3、深入研究了我国再发行政策变迁的效果，分析了配股政策和增发政策变迁的效果。虽然增发和配股政策历经变迁，但是基本没能有效降低上市公司的信息欺诈水平，再发行后业绩的恶化并没有得到有效改善；市场对于再发行门槛的设定基本持积极的态度，市场对再发行门槛经历了从积极到怀疑再到肯上海交通大学博士学位论文II定的过程，但由于业绩恶化和“圈钱”以及其他各类违规行为，长期看市场对政策的评价是消极的，政策变迁的效果并不十分明显。4、构建了证券发行注册制和核准制的一般模型，分别分析了两种发行监管制度下发行者和监管者的最优策略以及市场参与各方的收益情况。分析了二种监管制度下不同因素对最优决策的影响。利用社会福利损失和信息欺诈水平二个指标比较了两种发行监管制度的差别，分析了两种发行监管制度的适应性环境以及制度变迁的条件。关键词：证券发行监管，注册制，核准制，信息欺诈，信息披露策略，制度变迁IIIResearch on The Validity of Institutional Change of Chinese Securities Issuing Regulations and The Selection of InstitutionABSTRACTAs the basic institution and the first indoor of securities market, securities issuing supervision and management is very important. Developed markets and emerging markets both established relative complete institution of securities issuing supervision and management to regulate securities issuing and protect investors interests. We analyze the role of Chinese securities issuing supervision and management institution and the problem, then intent to provide helpful suggestions to accelerate the development of securities market in future. The dissertation summarizes the history of institutional change of Chinese securities issuing supervision and management, conducts empirical studies on the validity of institutional change of IPO and secondary equity offering (SEO) regulation. We establish a game model with four players: an issuer, an investor, an intermediary agency and a supervisor. In our game model we analyze issuers optimal disclosure strategy and supervisors optimal punishment level, and study the factors that affect issuers information cheating level. We analyze the difference between issuing registration system and examination and verification system through information cheating level and social welfare loss, then discuss their applicability environment and institutional change. At last we discuss the selection of institution. The primary innovations and work of this thesis are summarized in the following: 1. We build a game model through their gain to analyze their equilibrium strategy. We discuss factors that affect information cheating level and punishment level, including investors maturity, the degree of completeness of the law, supervisors regulation level, and the degree protecting investors profit. Then we study how to reduce information cheating level of securities issuing so as to promote truthful disclosure. 2. We build a model to evaluate the validity of institutional change of securities issuing supervision and management through operation achievement, information cheating level and securities market achievement. The results show that institutional上海交通大学博士学位论文IVchange cant always reach its expected goal, and we should emphasize research on the validity of institutional change of policy with completing IPO regulation system. 3. We analyze the validity of institutional change of SEO thoroughly, including right offerings and SEOs policy. Although right offerings and SEOs policy has changed many times, issuers information cheating level doesnt descend obviously, operation achievement still worsens after SEO. The validity of institutional change is not obviously effective. Institutional change of SEO is accepted by the investors.The long-term market is negative to SEOs policy. 4. A game model is constructed to evaluate these two types regulation systems and we make further theoretical deduction and empirical tests. We analyze issuers and supervisors optimal strategy of two type issuing regulation systems. We discuss the difference of the two types of issuing regulation systems through information cheating level and social welfare loss, and their optimal applicability environment and the condition of institutional change.Key words: securities issuing supervision, registration system, examination andverification system, information cheating, information disclosure strategy, institutional change上海交通大学学位论文原创性声明上海交通大学学位论文原创性声明本人郑重声明：所呈交的学位论文，是本人在导师的指导下，独立进行研究工作所取得的成果。除文中已经注明引用的内容外，本论文不包含任何其他个人或集体已经发表或撰写过的作品成果。对本文的研究做出重要贡献的个人和集体，均已在文中以明确方式标明。本人完全意识到本声明的法律结果由本人承担。学位论文作者签名：日期： 年 月 日上海交通大学学位论文版权使用授权书上海交通大学学位论文版权使用授权书本学位论文作者完全了解学校有关保留、使用学位论文的规定，同意学校保留并向国家有关部门或机构送交论文的复印件和电子版，允许论文被查阅和借阅。本人授权上海交通大学可以将本学位论文的全部或部分内容编入有关数据库进行检索，可以采用影印、缩印或扫描等复制手段保存和汇编本学位论文。保密保密，在 年解密后适用本授权书。 本学位论文属于不保密不保密。