B17The market for CEOs: An empirical analysis首席执行官市场的实证研究分析a b s t r a c tWe investigate empirically a market-based explanation for the rise in recent years in external CEO hiring and compensation and find, consistent with the market-based theory, that firms in industries relying on general managerial skills are more likely to hire CEOs externally than firms in industries relying less on such skills. We show that firms relying on internal CEOs have on average higher profits than external-CEO firms and that the difference in profits decreases as general skills become more important in the industry. We relate managerial skills to compensation and show that CEO general skills induce better firm performance and higher compensation.我们调查经验以市场为基础的解释为近年兴起的外部招聘的 CEO 和补偿，并找到与市场为基础的理论相一致，即在依靠一般的管理技能行业的公司更可能聘请外部的 CEO 比公司工业上这种技能依靠更少。我们表明，依靠内部的企业老总对平均比外部企业的 CEO 更高的利润，而利润的差异减小，一般技能成为行业中更为重要。我们与管理技能，以补偿和显示，首席执行官一般技能诱导更好的公司业绩和更高的报酬。1. IntroductionThe executive labor market in the U.S. has changed in several important ways in recent years:First, more companies are looking outside their organization for leadership than in the past. Second, CEOs from outside the company generally receive bigger pay packages than insiders. Finally, overall CEO compensation has risen considerably over the last three decades.There is disagreement in the academic literature on the causes of these trends. Bebchuk , Fried, and Walker (2002) argue that the escalation in CEO pay levels reflects a dysfunctional governance system that fails to check the power of entrenched CEOs. Spectacular governance failures at firms such as WorldCom, Tyco, and Enron reinforce the view that CEOs expropriate corporate assets at shareholders expense. By contrast Holmstrm and Kaplan (2001) argue that the U.S. corporate governance system works relatively well and that any defects associated with the CEO salary structure are more than offset by the competitive advantage of the U.S. corporate governance system. Frydman and Jenter (2010) argue that both rent-extraction and market-based effects are important determinants of CEO compensation, and the empirical validity of different theories remains an open question.行政劳动力市场在美国近年来在几个重要方面发生了变化：首先，越来越多的公司正在寻找他们的组织之外的领导比从前.其次 ，从公司外部的 CEO普遍获得了较大的薪酬比内部的.最后 ，总体 CEO 薪酬大大提升，在过去的三十年。有分歧对这些趋势的原因的学术文献。别布丘克.弗里德，和 Walker （ 2002）认为，在不断升级的 CEO 薪酬水平反映无法检查根深蒂固老总的力量一个不正常的治理体系。壮观的治理失败的公司，如世通，泰科，安然和加强认为，在老总牺牲股东利益侵占公司资产。相比之下霍姆斯特罗姆和 Kaplan （ 2001）认为，美国的公司治理制度运作相对良好，与 CEO 薪酬结构相关的任何缺陷均超过了美国公司治理制度的竞争优势所抵消。而弗和珍特（ 2010）认为，两者的租金提取和基于市场的影响是 CEO 薪酬的重要因素，而不同理论的实证效度仍然是一个悬而未决的问题。We investigate the market-driven explanation for the aforementioned trends in the executive labor market. The market-based theories, such as Murphy and Zbojnks (2004, 2007) and Frydmans (2006), posit that CEO salaries are determined by competition among firms for executives and are dependent on transferable CEO skills across firms and industries. As a result, increases in external CEO hiring and executive compensation are explained by increases in the importance of general skills, as distinct from firm-specific skills, in the management of corporations. In a similar vein, Gabaix and Landier (2008) show that the best CEO manages the largest firm through matches in the executive labor market, and that CEOs of larger firms receive higher pay because they have higher marginal productivity (skills). Following this logic, Brynjolfsson and Kim (2009) show that the use of information technology increases the size of the firm and the CEO wage.我们调查了市场驱动的解释为上述趋势在执行劳动市场。以市场为基础的理论，如墨菲和和而弗的（2006）Zbojnk （2004，2007） ，断定，首席执行官的薪酬是由企业间竞争的高管决定，都依赖于整个企业和产业转移的首席执行官技能。因此，增加外部招聘的 CEO 和高管薪酬是由增加的一般技能，从企业特有技能，独特的重要性解释，在公司的管理。与此类似，Gabaix 和 Landier（2008）表明，最好的 CEO，通过在执行劳动力市场的匹配管理上最大的公司，而大公司的 CEO 们获得更高的报酬，因为他们有较高的边际生产率（技能）。按照这一逻辑，布林约尔松和 Kim（2009）显示，利用信息技术提高企业的规模和首席执行官的工资。We follow Murphy and Zbojnks (2007) partial equilibrium model to develop our empirical hypotheses. In the model, the skill matrix of a CEO is categorized into general skills (human capital transferable across firms and industries) and firm-specific skills (human capital specific to a particular firm). In a competitive labor market, these skills are priced in compensation contracts. As a CEO moves between firms, her firm-specific skills are lost and only transferable or general skills are rewarded. As general skills become more important in an industry, the demand for CEOs with such skills (external CEOs) increases and the price for their services rises. Following these essential elements of the market-based model, we develop three testable empirical hypotheses: First, competition among firms for external CEOs results in the allocation to such CEOs of most of the surpluses generated from their recruitment, whereas firms capture most of the surpluses generated by the firm-specific skills of internal CEOs. As a result, an internal-CEO firm has a higher expected profit than an external-CEO firm. Second, as general management skills bec