Are regulatory management evaluations informative about bank accounting returns and risk监管是管理评估有关信息的银行会计收益与风险Keywords:Bank supervision, Corporate governance,Financial institutions关键词：银行监管，公司治理，金融机构a b s t r a c tThis paper considers the association between regulatory management evaluations and bank accounting returns and risk. For robustness, we estimate our tests using a matched sample with equal numbers of banks with and without weak regulatory management evaluations. We document a strong association between weak ex-ante regulatory assessments of management and poor accounting returns not explained by other nancial or regulatory indicators. We do not nd robust evidence that weak management evaluations are linked with risk. Our results suggest that regulatory assessments of bank management are informative and that better managed banks perform better without necessarily taking on greater risk.摘要本文认为，监管管理评估及银行会计收益与风险之间的关联。对于稳健性，我们估计，使用匹配的样本银行与人数相等，无薄弱的监管管理评估我们的测试。我们的文档管理薄弱事前监管评估和会计较差的回报不是由其他金融或监管指标解释之间有很强的相关性。我们没有找到有力的证据是薄弱的管理评估与风险挂钩。我们的研究结果表明，银行管理的监管评估是信息和更好地管理银行，而不必承担更大的风险有更好的表现。1. IntroductionThe recent collapse of major nancial rms such as Countrywide, Bears Sterns, and MF Global has lead to increased focus on the governance of nancial institutions. New regulatory policies have been initiated to improve bank governance and several academic studies have examined the governance of banks in relation to the crisis. For example, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) suggest a role for CEO incentives in crisis period bank performance. Mehran, Morrison, and Shapiro, (2011) explore differences in bank and non-bank governance and suggest improvements to bank governance. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) consider the role of governance and regulatory practices in crisis period bank performance. This paper is motivated by these recent studies and the increased regulatory interest in bank governance both of which suggest regulatory ability to assess bank governance is valuable.1。介绍的大型金融机构，如在全国范围内，罗森，和 MF 全球近崩溃导致越来越重视金融机构的治理。新的调控政策已经启动，以改善银行治理和几个学术研究探讨了银行的治理有关的危机。例如，Fahlenbrach 和斯图尔兹（2011）认为在危机时期银行业绩的 CEO 激励机制的作用。迈赫兰，莫里森和夏皮罗（2011）探讨银行和非银行治理的差异，并提出改进意见，银行治理。 Beltratti 和斯图尔兹（2012）认为治理和监管做法在危机期间银行业绩的作用。本文是由这些最近的研究动机和银行治理的监管提高利率这两个建议，以评估银行治理的监管能力是有价值的。While most of these studies highlight important aspects of regulatory information, they typically do not consider regulatory management evaluations. Therefore, the information content of regulatory management assessments is less well understood. DeYoung (1998) presents evidence that management ratings are associated with greater X-efciency. Palvia (2011, 2012) show that banks with worse management ratings are more likely to have executive turnover and Barakova and Palvia (2010) document a stronger relation between executive turnover and performance in banks with superior management ratings. Whalen (2010) shows that regulatory management ratings help predict bank failure in early warning models. This paper adds to this literature by considering whether regulatory management assessments explain bank performance, proxied by accounting returns, and bank riskiness, proxied by the standard deviation of accounting returns and the Z-score.虽然这些研究大多强调监管信息重要方面，他们通常不考虑监管的管理评估。因此，监管管理评估的信息内容不太好理解。迪扬（1998）提出的证据表明，管理评级与更大的X 效率有关。 Palvia（2011，2012）表明，银行管理较差的评级是更可能有高管离职和Barakova 和 Palvia（2010）文档具有超强的管理评级高管离职和性能之间的关系更强的银行。惠伦（2010）表明，监管管理评级有助于预测银行失败预警模型。本文补充了这一文学考虑监管管理评估是否说明银行业绩，通过会计代理报酬，以及银行风险程度，按会计收益和 Z 值的标准偏差代理。Our analysis uses propensity score matching techniques to create a matched sample containing approximately equal numbers of banks with and without weak management evaluations that are otherwise similar in several observable characteristics. We use a matched sample analysis because of its effectiveness in reducing selection bias, by selecting samples with greater covariate overlap, and its potential to mitigate endogeneity concerns, if the distribution of observable and unobservable characteristics is similar in banks with and without weak management ratings. For comparison, we also report all of our results using our full sample of banks.我们的分析使用倾向得分匹配技术来创建一个包含银行与不弱的管理评估是在几个观察的特点，否则类似的大约相等的数字匹配的样本。我们使用，因为它在减少选择偏倚的有效性，通过选择样本具有更大的协变量的重叠，并且其潜在的减轻内生性顾虑的配对样本分析，如果观察及不可观察的分布特点相似的银行有和没有管理薄弱评级。为了便于比较，我们还利用我们银行的全样本报告我们所有的结果。Our results document a statistically and economically signicant association between weak regulatory management assessments and inferior accounting returns. The association remains, and in many cases is stronger, in our matched sample results. In contrast, we nd no robust evidence that better management is associated with more risk; in particular, there is no statistical relation between our measures of risk and management assessments in the matched sample. Taken together, the results suggest that better performance for better managed banks is not driven by higher levels of risk-taking.我们的研究结果记录薄弱的监管管理评估伪劣会计收益之间的统计学和经济显著关联。该协会仍然存在，而且在许多情况下是强大的，在我们的样本相匹配的结果。相比之下，我们没有发现有力的证据，更好地管