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Laws on Laws on Business Business Organizations: A Organizations: A Comparative Comparative StudyStudy2比较商事组织法比较商事组织法法律硕士课程法律硕士课程( (法学法学) )3BibliographyBibliography Any Textbooks you studied before A research paper on any Corporate Law issues Roberta Romano, Foundations of Corporate Law公司法基础(影印本), 法律出版社,北京,2005年3月第一版. Brian R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation林华伟 等译,法律出版社, 北京,2001年4月第一版.4ContentContentTheory of the Firm and Capital Market Legal Characteristics of the Corporation: Limited Liability The Production and Structure of Corporation Laws Financing the Corporation Internal Governance Structures External Governance Structures: The Market for Corporate Control Securities Regulation5What I Expect from youWhat I Expect from youClass presentation and discussionOff-class Preview and ReviewOpen-minded6(2010-2020)公开征求意见稿丰田汽车召回香港华懋集团前董事局主席龚如心遗产案AVATAR7Theory of the Firm and Theory of the Firm and Capital Markets (1)Capital Markets (1) 为什么有企业/厂商?交易市场和企业/厂商 它们在资本市场的地位和作用 代理成本和交易成本(为什么代理成本在现代企业不可避免?)1929年,Berle和Means的调查表明,当时美国200个最大的公司中,88个是由管理人员控制的. Berle和Means认为,股东对于代理成本的监督是无能为力的,你是否同意这一看法? 授权机制的优势和弊端8Theory of the Firm and Theory of the Firm and Capital Markets (2)Capital Markets (2) 为什么股东被称为 “剩余财产的所有者” (Residual Owners)? 股东表决权-集体行为-监督成本-信息取得的代价 (在股权分散的情况下,为什么股东都愿意做消极股东,搭便车-Free Riders 会很普遍?) 如何约束代理人的机会主义行为?(代理成本是所有和控制分离的代价,第7页)9Theory of the Firm and Theory of the Firm and Capital Markets (2)Capital Markets (2) 股价能否反映公司管理人员的懈怠或其他机会主义行为? 监督机制包括哪些方面?10Theory of the Firm and Theory of the Firm and Capital Markets (3)Capital Markets (3) 经理和股东存在利益冲突,代理成本不可能为零;所有者是代理成本的最终承担者,增加代理成本则可以使经理单方面受益,这里就出现了需要法律敢于的现象-成本转嫁(Externality),也界定了法律干预的目标-减少代理成本.因此,检验公司法的合理性,重要的是看它是否减少了代理成本. 方流芳:序言,第3页.Jensen & Meckling !结合我国,你如何理解我国法律是否减少了代理成本,请举例说明.11Theory of the Firm and Theory of the Firm and Capital Markets (4)Capital Markets (4) 企业正是针对机会主义交易成本和合同不完备的回应(p.10).当合同一方是 “交易专用财产”(trade-specific assets)的所有者时,交易双方组建企业比签定合同更有效率(pp.11-15) Oliver Williamson12Theory of the Firm and Theory of the Firm and Capital Markets (5)Capital Markets (5) Henry Hansmann-权衡缔约成本和所有权成本 企业所有权类型和所有权成本存在相关性.投资者所有雇员所有所有者缺位 当所有权成本过高的时候,没有所有者比 “产权清晰”更重要.13Theory of the Firm and Theory of the Firm and Capital Markets (6)Capital Markets (6) 以保险公司与投保人的关系为例,说明公司股东与管理者的关系. Sole Ownership-Partial Ownership Pecuniary Benefits-Non-pecuniary Benefits14Theory of the Firm and Theory of the Firm and Capital Markets (7)Capital Markets (7) 在了解代理成本的存在之后,你的投资选择是什么? 在放弃全部所有权归自己所有的企业形式后,投资者会面临哪些合同关系?Nexus of Contracts 作为投资者,你希望公司法或者公司章程加入企业社会责任的内容吗?15Theory of the Firm and Theory of the Firm and Capital Markets (8)Capital Markets (8) Question 8 at pp.24-25. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economics 386, 1937. 中文译本?16Institutional ArrangementsInstitutional Arrangements 在交易成本为零的条件下,制度的选择不会影响经济活动的最终效益.在交易成本不为零的现实世界里,制度的安排会在不同程度上影响交易的效益. 郁光华:,法律出版社2006年版,第38页. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1, 1960.17Further Reading MaterialsFurther Reading Materials Roberta Romano, pp.26-60.18Legal Characteristics of the Legal Characteristics of the Corporation: Limited LiabilityCorporation: Limited Liability What features a corporation? Please provide your understanding and observations.19Reading MaterialsReading Materials Limited Liability and the Corporation Limited Liability in the Theory of the Firm Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts20Four Characteristic Four Characteristic Limited Liability for Investors Free Transferability of Shares Perpetual Life Centralized ManagementSee the Textbook21Close Corporation vs. Close Corporation vs. Public CorporationPublic Corporation Why is Limited Liability crucial to a modern corporation?Limited liabilityCorporationShareholderCreditor22有限责任的形成有限责任的形成 代表性论文如下: *Paul L. Davis, Gower and Davis Principles of Modern Company Law, 40-46 (6th Ed, 1997). *Phillip Blumburg, Limited Liability and Corporate Group, 11 Journal of Corporate Law 573 (1986).23对于公司法人人格与股东有限责对于公司法人人格与股东有限责任合并意义的思考任合并意义的思考 公司法人人格-积极的资产区分/公司财产成为公司债权人的担保财产,为公司债权人设定优先于股东或者公司经营者的债权人受偿的浮动担保(floating charge),公司债权人在评估公司财产时具有比较优势 股东有限责任-消极的资产区分/股东的个人财产成为股东的债权人的担保财产,降低了公司破产时的债权追讨成本,简化并实质性地稳定了股票的定价过程 总体意义-便利交易另一方明确交易对象,区分公司与其股东,公司及其股东的总体融资成本得以降低24对交易另一方的提示对交易另一方的提示-来自公司法人人格来自公司法人人格与股东有限责任原则的适用与股东有限责任原则的适用 共担和转嫁交易风险-债权人参与监督公司经营者 隔离公司的不同经营活动与监督成本的增加信息不对称(Information Asymmetry)参见:Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 Yale Law Journal 387 (2000).25Limited LiabilityLimited Liability Do you agree that Limited Liability eliminates the risk of business failure? -作为有限责任的对价,应当要求公司服从政府管制为顾客,雇员和相邻社区的利益考虑而决策和行事. What does “externalization of risk” mean in the context of Limited Liability?26Why Limited Liability: Why Limited Liability: Some TheoriesSome Theories Limited Liability and Theory of Firms Limited Liability and Corporate Capital Information and Costs Insurance: A Substitute27Limited Liability reduces Limited Liability reduces costscosts “We know from the survival of l
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