Slide #2-1Part 1 Introduction Chapter 2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEMSlide #2-2Chapter ObjectivesFunction of Financial MarketsClassifications of Financial MarketsFunction of Financial IntermediariesTypes of Financial IntermediariesRegulation of Financial MarketsSlide #2-3Function of Financial Markets 1. Allows transfers of funds from person or business without investment opportunities to one who has them2. Improves economic efficiencySlide #2-4一、聚敛二、配置功能 三、调节功能四、反映功能 国民经济的“晴雨表”和“气象台” Function of Financial Markets Slide #2-5Chapter ObjectivesFunction of Financial MarketsClassifications of Financial MarketsFunction of Financial IntermediariesTypes of Financial IntermediariesRegulation of Financial Markets江西癫痫病医院江西癫痫病医院Slide #2-6Slide #2-7Slide #2-8Slide #2-9Slide #2-10Slide #2-11Slide #2-12Slide #2-13Slide #2-14Slide #2-15Slide #2-16Slide #2-17Slide #2-18Asymmetric Information: Adverse Selection and Moral HazardAdverse Selection1. Before transaction occurs2. Potential borrowers most likely to produce adverse outcome are ones most likely to seek loan and be selectedSlide #2-19Asymmetric Information: Adverse Selection and Moral HazardExample: r = 8%, 20% loan = 100 - Borrower A: has project with 10% return with100% probability of success - Borrower B: project with 100% return with 75% probability of success (25% prob. of failure)Slide #2-20Asymmetric Information: Adverse Selection and Moral HazardMoral Hazard1. After transaction occurs2. Hazard that borrower has incentives to engage in undesirable (immoral) activities making it more likely that wont pay loan back Slide #2-21Asymmetric Information: Adverse Selection and Moral HazardMoral HazardExample: int. rate = 8% - Loan approved for Project I: 10% return with 100% probability of success- New opportunity Project II: 100% return with 80% probability of success (20% prob. of failure)Slide #2-22Diamond ( 1984) Diamond ( 1984) 对对Leland Leland 和和PylePyle( 1977) ( 1977) 做了一个重要推广做了一个重要推广: : 假设企业家的投资项目的回报是独立分布假设企业家的投资项目的回报是独立分布的的, , 那么他们可以联合起来向投资者借款。这样那么他们可以联合起来向投资者借款。这样, , 每个项目的期望回报每个项目的期望回报不变不变, , 但由于多元化但由于多元化, , 其风险大大降低了其风险大大降低了, , 从而减少了信息不对称带来的从而减少了信息不对称带来的资本成本资本成本, , 这样的联合便是银行。银行可以克服企业家和投资者之间的这样的联合便是银行。银行可以克服企业家和投资者之间的信息不对称信息不对称, , 吸收存款并投资于银行有内部信息的投资项目。吸收存款并投资于银行有内部信息的投资项目。信息发掘( information provision)受委托的监管者(deligated monitor)Williamson( 1986) , Williamson( 1986) , KrasaKrasa 和和VillamilVillamil( 1992) ( 1992) 等文献都抓住了银等文献都抓住了银行的这一重要特征行的这一重要特征: : 银行是大量投资人和融资人的联合银行是大量投资人和融资人的联合, , 能集中处能集中处理监管企业的任务理监管企业的任务, , 并且能更好的解决信息不对称问题。银行的并且能更好的解决信息不对称问题。银行的这一优势核心在于其多元化发放贷款这一优势核心在于其多元化发放贷款, , 因此对存款人来说因此对存款人来说, , 只要银只要银行足够大行足够大, , 就不需要监管银行能否按时还款。就不需要监管银行能否按时还款。金融中介：文献综述和最新发展，黄张凯，管理世界，金融中介：文献综述和最新发展，黄张凯，管理世界，20062006（2 2）Slide #2-23Chapter ObjectivesSlide #2-24Financial IntermediariesSlide #2-25Types of Financial IntermediariesDepository Institutions (Banks)Commercial banksCommercial banksSavings & Loan Associations (S&Ls)Savings & Loan Associations (S&Ls)Mutual Savings BanksMutual Savings BanksCredit UnionsCredit UnionsSlide #2-26Commercial banksnDefined by the Functions It Serves and the Roles It PlaynA financial intermediary accepting deposits and granting loans nOffer the widest range of financial services. -Financial department storesSlide #2-27The Bank Balance SheetSlide #2-28China Big Four Banks (12/31/2002) v.s. All US Banks (12/31/2002)Slide #2-29Banks Income StatementSlide #2-30Banking Risks and ReturnsSlide #2-31GovernmentalregulatorCompetitorsHurry!Hurry!Just an InchRemained!Credit riskLiquidity riskMarket riskprofitabilityExposure to risksOperational riskWell Done!Bank GOALCustomersstockholdersCapital riskLegal riskReputational riskSlide #2-32Fundamental risksCredit riskLiquidity riskMarket riskOperational riskReputational riskLegal riskCapital or solvency偿付能力riskSlide #2-33Types of Financial Intermediaries Contractual Savings Institutions(契约性储蓄机构包括各种保险公司和养老基金。它们的共同特征是以合约方式定期定量地从持约人手中收取资金（保险费或养老金预付款），然后按合约规定向持约人提供保险服务或养老金。)Life insurance companiesFire & casualty insurance companiesPension funds, government retirement fundsSlide #2-34假设某人寿保险公司拥有100 000个保单持有人，他们每个人都是40岁，每个客户申请100万美元的保单。保险公司应向每个保单持有人收取多少保险费呢？确定预期死亡人数。100 000*4/000=400预期索赔金额=100*400=4亿假设该保险公司的分析家估计本年其投资组合平均收益率为8%。 预期索赔现值=4亿/（1+8%）=370.4百万估计每个保单持有人的净保险费= 370.4百万/100 000=3 704Slide #2-35Types of Financial IntermediariesSlide #2-36Finance Company Balance Sheet AssetsBillions of dollarsPercent of TotalConsumer loans255.327%Business loans335.136%Real estate loans 98.511%Less reserve for loan losses-65.6-7%Other assets313.633%Total Assets936.9100%Liabilities Bank Loans24.9 3%Commercial paper 226.924%Owed to parent58.3 6%Debt not elsewhere 337.736%Other liabilities185.420%Equity 103.711%Total Liabilities and Equity 936.9 100%Slide #2-37Mutual Funds on the RiseSlide #2-38 THE END!