Empirical Study of CEO Succession in Chinese Public Traded EnterprisesAbstractAn examination of 172 CEO successions in P. R. China during 2001 reveals that external successions are more likely in firms with poor performance, in firms with low inside director proportion on board, in firms with outside dominant shareholder, and in firms with less internal successor candidates. Dominant shareholder is found to have great influence upon the type of successor chosen, and this result has implications for corporate governance structure not only in Chinese transitional context but also in Western market economies. In addition, predecessors influence upon the type of successor chosen is found to be rather limited.Key Words: executive succession; corporate governance; transitional economyResearch Area：Business and Organization Management中国上市公司CEO继任的实证研究摘要本文通过对于2001年172家中国上市公司的CEO 继任事件的研究，揭示了新任CEO是从企业内部选拔还是从外部空降是与公司的业绩、内部董事占董事会的比例、控股股东的类别和公司内部候选人的充裕程度是显著相关的。本研究发现控股股东对于中国上市公司新任CEO的选拔具有非常显著的影响，这对于探讨转型经济中的企业治理结构是非常有意义的。另外本研究还发现公司前任CEO对于下任的影响并不是非常的显著。本文采用相关分析和logit回归。关键词: 领导更迭、企业治理、转型经济研究领域：工商管理与管理经济学 Empirical Study of CEO Succession in Chinese Public Traded EnterprisesThe importance of chief executive officer successionExecutive succession has long been a focus of organizational research, and much of that research has examined chief executive officer (CEO) succession. This emphasis is understandable, given the widespread belief that an organizations CEO has a substantial impact on its performance (Lauterbach, Vu & Weisberg, 1999) and a belief that the phenomenon of CEO succession is significantly different from personnel replacement at lower hierarchical levels (Rowan, 1983). Of the variety of successor characteristics that could be potentially examined, researchers have singled out previous organizational affiliation as especially critical (Friedman & Olk, 1989; Reinganum, 1985). CEO successor origin refers to whether an incumbent CEO was an employee of the firm he or she leads at the time of appointment (Kesner & Sebora, 1994). Previous studies on CEO succession usually assume that firms operate in a market economy. Studies in a transitional context like China have been very sparse. Economic environment in the transitional economy differ greatly from that of the market economy, but little is known about CEO succession practice in the transitional environment. For example, in China the corporatization process of State-owned Enterprises did not started until 20 years ago, and during that process the government either transferred the ownership of these former state-owned enterprises to the company itself or sold the ownership of the company to other companies. Due to the short history of ownership trading, the ownership of Chinese enterprises was relatively concentrated. Compared with the extremely dispersed corporate ownership structures in Anglo-American context, this kind of ownership structure is expected to have some unique impact upon organizations critical management decision such as CEO successor chosen. For organizational researcher, such a transition offers a unique opportunity to expand Western theory on antecedents that influence CEO succession management.The purpose of this study is to suggest a set of theoretical hypotheses in the source of CEO appointments in the transitional context. Following the past studies, I examined the antecedents of CEO successor origin from the following five perspectives: pre-succession performance, board composition, ownership structure, predecessor influence, and the abundance of internal candidates. But I diverged from previous studies in that I explored the influence of ownership structure through examining the type of dominant shareholders. As stated above, the ownership of Chinese enterprises is rather concentrated, and thus dominant shareholder is expected to have the incentive and ability to influence CEO successor choice. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTInside vs. Outside SuccessionPast research examining successor origin has generally concluded that insider succession represents the maintenance of past practice and thus is less disruptive to an organization than does outsider succession (Dalton & Kesner, 1983). Lauterbach and Weisberg (1996) argued that internal successor has developed the existing corporate strategy with incumbent management, and that he or she is more likely to keep on current strategies, corporate culture, and control structure. In contrast, top managers brought from outside the organization are thought to have broader perspectives and a penchant for change. Helmich and Brown (1972) claimed that an external succession could achieve more drastic changes in the company because the external manager is not bind by old policies and implicit contracts within the firm.Firm PerformanceOne variable that has been exam